The purpose of this paper is to revisit Keynes's ideas on knowledge, expectations and rationality in the light of interpretations and developments over the last few decades. Keynes's philosophy focused on establishing grounds for belief under the general conditions of uncertainty. He argued that calculative individualistic rationality (in the standard mainstream economics sense) had limited scope. He developed these ideas within his macroeconomics in terms of a theory of expectations and confidence in expectations, emphasizing the role of social conventions as a basis for judgment. Keynes saw sociality interplaying with individuality also in terms of ethics, and the idea of public institutions as a vehicle for promoting social good. Keynes's ideas on knowledge suggest a pluralist methodology for economics, employing a range of models and sources of evidence, based on a notion of rationality as 'reasonableness'.
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We are faced at every turn with the problems of an organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity -the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity fail us, small changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied.
Keynes notably applied one feature of an organic system, the fallacy of composition, in his macroeconomics. For example the paradox of thrift arises when individual intentions to increase saving are thwarted by their macroeconomic consequences, something of concern in current circumstances. Similarly there is a paradox of liquidity, whereby the attempt to make portfolios more liquid reduces the liquidity in the system, as we experienced during the banking crisis. Individuals cannot be sure of their expectations being met, creating uncertainty.
More generally, an organic system involves complex and evolving interactions among heterogeneous and evolving elements. The result is the problem of induction explored by Hume (of whom Keynes was a scholar; see Carabelli 1988) . If the system's internal structure is evolving in a non-deterministic manner, and the influences to which it is subject in the future are not known (or all knowable) in advance, then the scope for using frequency distributions to quantify a probabilistic or stochastic expectation is lacking. Keynes believed that this was particularly the case with social systems. While probability might not be quantifiable, there may be scope for an ordinal notion of probability, such that one outcome is judged on the basis of the evidence to be more probable than another. But even then, there are cases which are incommensuratehow do we compare the probability of a further banking crisis in 2011 against the 5 probability of nuclear war in 2015 for example? There is a large subsequent literature on subjective quantitative valuations of probability around the subjective expected utility (SEU) approach, which implies that agents are nevertheless able to make subjective quantitative estimates of probability with respect to all variables. But Keynes (1931) pointed to the inadequacy Ramsay's (1931) use of formal inductive logic as the basis for subjective probability (Gerrard 2003) . In an organic system, we cannot logically be certain that the past is an adequate guide to the future. Indeed, in the context of SEU theory, Savage (1954: 15-6) himself warns that it is practical only in suitably limited domains to assume that agents are capable of a complete preference ordering of all possible choices: 'carried to its logical extreme [such an assumption] is utterly ridiculous … because the task implied is not even remotely resembled by human possibility'.
In particular, the SEU framework does not take account of uncertainty, on account of which agents may prefer to keep options open rather than commit to a choice (Davidson 2009: 108-9) . In other words, there is the possibility that uncertainty may be so high as to preclude any 'bets' at all (Runde 1995) , as evidenced by the customary exclusions from insurance policies on a routine basis, or the refusal to enter a market under conditions of particular uncertainty. The freezing of the interbank market during the recent banking crisis, for example, reflected such high uncertainty as to the riskiness of bank assets that banks were no longer prepared to lend to each other. Similarly, when uncertainty is too high to justify commitment to capital investment, firms' preference to keep assets liquid (and thus options open) is high (Davidson 2003) . High liquidity preference has been a notable feature of the current crisis, reflecting the high degree of uncertainty about future economic developments (Bibow 2009 ).
6 While Keynes's theory of probability undermines the logical foundation for a general frequentist theory of probability itself, he also undermined any idea of a general frequentist theory of confidence, or uncertainty. Keynes introduced the notion of weight of argument as the determinant of confidence, where weight is generally higher the higher the amount of relevant evidence brought to bear (relative to relevant ignorance).
But of course what is relevant is itself theoretically loaded, and theoretical understandings can change (Dow 1995) . It should therefore not be assumed that weight inevitably increases with amount of evidence; in particular more evidence may reveal new realms of ignorance (Runde 1990) . Weight falls if new evidence reveals previously unrecognized 'unknown unknowns', as happened with the financial crisis. Finally, there is no direct correspondence between degree of confidence and degree of probability, so there may for example be high confidence that an outcome has low probability, and vice versa.
It is therefore not possible to order all possibilities according to risk and uncertainty in a reliable way. Even if it were feasible to contemplate an identification of all future possibilities and complete orderings of these according to risk, the degree of uncertainty attached to these calculations is liable to discrete shifts according, not only to new information, but also how that information feeds back into the subjective knowledge system which generated the risk estimates. While the basis for decision-making, eg in portfolio choice, may be expressed formally in terms of probability and weight (Dequech 2005) , the derivation of probability and weight cannot be derived deductively. In any case the outcome depends on attitude to confidence (or uncertainty) which is also subject to shifts, and is therefore also not a purely logical derivation.
Positive action in spite of uncertainty requires the exercise of animal spirits (Dow and Dow 1985) , or low uncertainty-aversion (Dequech 1999) . A positive decision, or action, is more likely the higher the weight of argument, and the lower the aversion to uncertainty. In analyzing the investment decision, for example, Keynes (1936: 149) implied that a rational investor (in the Benthamite sense) would never invest at all since expectations as to return were bound to be uncertain: 'The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made.' Keynes argued that, in an open organic system, reason and evidence alone are not sufficient for judgment, to yield theoretical conclusions or to justify decision making. Yet agents normally do manage to form a view when uncertainty is present, but not prohibitive. Keynes argued that this was made possible by recourse to conventional judgment as an input to individual judgment.
We do not know what the future holds. Nevertheless, as living and moving beings, we are forced to act. Peace and comfort of mind require that we should hide from ourselves how little we foresee. Yet we must be guided by some hypothesis. We tend, therefore, to substitute for the knowledge which is unattainable certain conventions, the chief of which is to assume, contrary to all likelihood, that the future will resemble the past. (Keynes 1937b:124) In spite of the problem of induction, past evidence is the most reliable source of knowledge we have, adding weight to argument. Two other common conventions which Keynes (1937a: 114) identified are: relying on expert opinion and following conventional expectations.
Conventional judgment in conditions of uncertainty cannot be based on demonstrable logic any more than individual judgment. Yet it provides a more objective benchmark for individual judgment, as a point of reference (Davis 1994: 117, 133) . The use of conventional judgment, as well as conventions more broadly, not only assists the individual but is also socially useful. As Hodgson (1988: 205) put it:
The argument, in short, is that in a world of uncertainty, where the probabilistic calculus is ruled out, rules, norms and institutions play a functional role in providing a basis for decision-making, expectation and belief. Without these 'rigidities', without social routine and habit to reproduce them, and without institutionally conditioned conceptual frameworks, an uncertain world would present a chaos of sense data in which it would be impossible for the agent to make sensible decisions and to act.
Insofar as most agents follow social conventions, they normally act to stabilise markets.
Indeed markets in general function successfully only because participants observe social norms in trading, for example. Similarly the institution of money has developed to provide liquidity in the face of uncertainty, and central banks have evolved in order to support that role.
Keynes argued that conventional judgment is particularly important for financial markets. Keynes (1936: ch. 12 ) explored the juxtaposition of the long-term expectations of firms seeking to invest in capital projects, and the short-term expectations of capital markets as the source of finance. For firms, as Shackle (1955) explained, capital projects are 'crucial experiments'; it is clear that frequency distribution data are inadequate for projecting long-term yields, and animal spirits are vital. For capital markets on the other hand, where sociality dominates over individuality, and where the relevant variables are more clearly expectational than for producers, social conventions play a more important role. Both entrepreneurs and financial markets require both conventional judgment and animal spirits to some degree, but arguably Keynes's analysis of conventions has more force for financial markets.
However, conventional judgment in financial markets may fuel instability, because it is prone to discrete shifts. Another expression for conventional judgement is 'market sentiment', which played a powerful role in the banking crisis. Conventional expectations that the long boom in asset prices would continue fuelled the boom; these expectations were shared by the banks, capital markets and households, encouraging the credit creation and asset purchases which fuelled the boom. Yet when awareness grew of the implications of structured products containing unknown elements of toxic debt, there was a massive turnaround in market sentiment, which created the crisis. Certainly information was concealed, or wilfully ignored, and incentives encouraged more risky behaviour than otherwise. There is an extent to which we can talk about conventional valuations losing touch with the underlying reality, ie they were unreasonable. But the underlying reality for financial markets is in turn influenced by market valuations and the resulting decisions as to investment, production and consumption.
Keynes's argument is that there is no basis on which to identify anything we might regard as a 'true' market valuation of any asset, since any valuation is contingent on unknown and unknowable future developments. Markets require some conventional judgement by which to establish prices, and as a benchmark for opinion. We have seen that his analysis precludes the complete ordering of assets required by the rationality axioms of mainstream choice theory. We consider now where Keynes's analysis leaves us on the subject of rationality, and focus on the fact that understanding of rationality is contingent on the type of logic being applied.
Keynes on Rationality
Rationality in the sense in which the term is used in mainstream economics is the application of calculative deductive logic (ie formal logic) to a set of premises taken as given (optimizing behaviour with respect to a set of preferences, endowments and technologies). It requires agents to make calculative choices among the array of all possible options (including contingent options), and for these choices to be consistent. As long as deductive logic is correctly applied and contradiction avoided, the system itself will be internally consistent.
The formal logic view of rationality places huge knowledge demands on economic agents. But Keynes had argued that the scope for calculative rationality was very limited, given the relative shortage of knowledge which could be held with certainty (including certainty equivalence). If probabilistic expectations (even where they can be calculated) are held with varying degrees of confidence, and confidence may shift discretely with expert or conventional opinion (or fail altogether), the rational optimum set of choices cannot be deduced.
In his response to Ramsey's subjective probability approach, Keynes pointed to Ramsey's reliance on induction as the 'useful mental habit' we employ given the shortcomings of formal axiomatic logic under uncertainty. Ramsey identified recourse to convention as 'human logic', as opposed to 'formal logic'. The theory of knowledge which Keynes developed in his economics conforms more to Ramsey's idea of human logic (Gerrard 2003 ). As we have seen, this draws on inductive logic, in the sense that evidence is brought to bear as far as possible. It was in this sense that Keynes referred to 'rational' belief, as opposed to mere belief (Winslow 2003) . But induction is not sufficient given the organic nature of the economic system. So conventional knowledge and animal spirits are required to fill the gap if action is to be taken. We can therefore understand rational judgment within human logic as 'reasonable judgment' -employing evidence and reason as far as possible.
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Of course not all conventions are reasonable (just as not all conventions are moral). In particular, Keynes identified the conventional goal of financial accumulation as unreasonable, indeed as pathological (Winslow 2003) . On the other hand, in the absence of alternative knowledge, the convention of assuming the future to be like the past is not unreasonable:
It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain. It is reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about which we feel somewhat confident, even though they may be less decisively relevant to the issue that other facts about which our knowledge is vague and scanty (Keynes 1936: 148) .
What is not reasonable, within this framework, is to focus on what we confidently know in one respect when it is contradicted by what we know we don't know. Thus, according to the well-known joke, a drunk insists on looking for his keys under a lamppost because he can see better there, even though he knows he dropped his keys elsewhere. This is not reasonable behaviour.
But rationality in the formal logic sense can itself be a social convention, and apparently dominated thinking in the financial sector, with its reliance on quantitative models to predict asset prices as if the data were drawn from an atomic system with a fixed structure. Given this convention, we are driven by the need to appear to others as rational. Thus an investment decision may be presented as a comparison between the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest as if the former were knowable. This is a useful procedure 'which saves our faces as rational economic men', even although it cannot generally provide a rational basis for decisions (Keynes 1937a: 114) . But actual decisions are taken, reasonably and of necessity, on the basis of reference to conventional judgments and ultimately on the basis of animal spirits (Carabelli 1988 , Dow 1991 . But it can also be reasonable for individual decision makers, with their own evidence, creative thinking and animal spirits, to flout convention (Dequech 2003) . In other words, conventional judgment and animal spirits may well conflict.
Part of the conventional formal logic view is a dualism between rationality and irrationality/emotion (Dow 1990 ). Discussion of social conventions and, even more, animal spirits, raises the issue of the relationship between psychology and economics, between emotion and rationality (with which the two disciplines were traditionally associated, respectively). Deductivist logic sees the two as distinct and mutuallyexclusive. But for Keynes, as for Hume, emotion was integral to his theory of human nature and thus of human decision-making. And indeed the modern psychology literature points to the need for emotion, or 'affect', to motivate behaviour (see for example Damasio 1994 ). Keynes's evolving thinking on this subject was captured in his essay Rationality is important -some reasons are given to justify decisions. But these reasons can include support from social convention, or a dismissal of concerns over 15 uncertainty, as well as a more conventional theoretical argument. Indeed support from social convention and dismissal of concern with uncertainty can be employed by economists as much as by business investors. The key is that formal deductivist logic yields definitive conclusions which can be classified as rational (even if they cannot be justified in relation to the nature of the economic system), while human logic yields arguments which involve reasoned judgment which is always open for discussion. There is no hard and fast divide between what is rational and what is irrational in human logic.
Implications for Methodology
We noted earlier that Keynes's theory of knowledge was intended to apply to economists as well as to agents. Uncertainty for economists means that certainty equivalence is beyond our grasp. Although economists by definition push reason further and analyse more evidence than others, these are not enough for forming judgments under uncertainty and so we too draw on conventional knowledge and knowledge conventions. Theory then evolves when new connections are made on the basis of creative thinking, fuelled by animal spirits.
One of the strongest conventions in mainstream economics is to employ general equilibrium analysis, based on rational optimizing individual behaviour, to aim for the one best model the economy. Lucas (1980) argued that Keynesian uncertainty was formalized and therefore operationalized by the later technical advances in economics.
For example, formal macro modeling techniques allowed economists (and agents) to correctly anticipate the macroeconomic consequences of individual action, and thus subvert any fallacy of composition. Similar analytical optimism is evident in current attempts to model the macroeconomic phenomenon of systemic risk. Inattention to systemic interdependencies between financial portfolios in decision-making at the micro level was a feature of the run-up to the crisis, causing a paradox of liquidity.
A complete modeling system which yields definitive predictions (or at least multiple equilibria) requires the following conditions: given structures with fixed (or at least predictably random) interrelations between separable parts (eg economic agents) and predictable (or at least predictably random) outside influences. Such a system is a Economic agents are seen by Keynes as drawing on a range of incommensurate sources of knowledge which, in combination with the exercise of judgment, provide the basis for decision making. By the same token, economists too face uncertainty with respect to the future of an economy, and should therefore also draw on a range of (incommensurate) sources of knowledge. It is one of the main attractions of mathematics that it is capable of making different arguments commensurate. Thus, variables such as confidence, uncertainty aversion etc can be combined in a formal system (see for example Dequech 2000) . But if these variables cannot be derived formally from a foundational account of behaviour and further are not quantifiable, then such a model is not sufficient for prediction. Further, as Chick and Dow (2001) argue, the process of formalization is non-neutral in that it tends to change meanings. According to Keynes (1936:297) , formal modelling is therefore best used as an aid to thought, rather than something which alone yields definitive final answers:
The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer, but to provide ourselves with an organised and orderly method of thinking out particular problems; and, after we have reached a provisional conclusion by isolating the complicating factors one by one, we then have to go back on ourselves and allow, as well as we can, for the probable interactions of the factors amongst themselves. This is the nature of economic thinking. Any other way of applying our formal principle (without which, however, we shall be lost in the wood) will lead us into error.
Any formal model is a closed system. Variables are specified, identified as endogenous or exogenous, and relations specified between them. They are a mechanism for separating off some aspect of an open-system reality for analysis. But, for consistency with the subject matter, any analytical closure needs to be justified on the grounds that, for the purposes of the analysis, it is not unreasonable to treat the variables as having a stable identity, to have stable interrelations, and not to be subject to unanticipated A Keynesian analysis thus would employ a range of models and methods of gathering evidence, much of which will be incommensurate; were they commensurate, we would be back to general equilibrium theory as a complete system. There might be contradictions, in the sense that one variable might be endogenous to one chain of reasoning and exogenous to another (as provisional forms of abstraction). The emphasis is rather on consistency with the organic nature of the subject matter and thus the uncertainty of any knowledge about it. This is a pluralist strategy, as against a monist strategy addressed to generating a complete formal system (Salanti and Screpanti, eds,
1997, Dow 2004).
Such a methodology is addressed to raising confidence in economists' judgment. Finally, while partial formal models are important, we need to return to Keynes's theory of knowledge to recall that the source of uncertainty is changes in conventional judgment, especially as to confidence in expectations, as well as to the exercise of agency under animal spirits which may encourage discrete shifts in conventional judgment.
Neither deductive logic nor inductive logic can predict such things with certainty.
Therefore theory incorporates socio-psychological variables which cannot be explained, and yet are not random; they can only be observed, and signs picked up of impending changes using alternative methods. Thus, while it is welcome that systemic risk is now being modelled so that the interdependencies in the financial structure are better understood, the predictive power of such models is limited by the inability to explain or predict the state of confidence and changes in it, ie market sentiment. Methods to identify and observe market sentiment, as well as other aspects of conventional behaviour, would therefore be part of a pluralist strategy for understanding financial markets.
Conclusion
In considering rationality and the microfoundations issue in the light of Keynes's ideas, we have seen the centrality of uncertainty. For agents, uncertainty prevents a definitive complete ordering of assets (and possibilities more generally), such that decision-making must rely on additional input from social convention and from animal spirits. Since these 22 are both liable to indeterminate discrete shifts, as well as mutual conflict, there is scope for market behaviour to be unstable in a way which is very difficult to anticipate (as to timing, direction and degree). Such behaviour may well be reasonable, given existing knowledge, particularly within the internal logic of financial markets. At the same time, conventional understandings (eg with respect to the ability of the central bank to support the banking system) will reduce uncertainty and stabilise markets. But there may also be conflict with other social conventions (eg as to justice in relation to remuneration across sectors) prompting individual responses and a political response in the form of regulation.
The knowledge base for individual decision-making is not homogeneous.
The rationality implied for agents is more like something we could call 'reasonableness', avoiding the strict conditions for the mainstream notion of rationality which uncertainty precludes us from satisfying. This focus on the possibilities for knowledge for the individual has pointed us in the direction of the social, in the form of social conventions.
Uncertainty too is crucial for economists themselves in attempting to theorise about this non-homogeneous economic system, with its interplay between individuality and sociality. Given this subject matter, both deductive and inductive logic fall short, so that economists too must employ conventions as to how to proceed. While a dominant convention has been to seek one best, formal, general equilibrium model, this has created inconsistencies with actual behaviour which is conditioned by uncertainty. The methodology which emerges from Keynes's theory of knowledge is instead a pluralist one, mirroring the multi-pronged approach he suggested we take to knowledge as agents.
This implies using a range of partial models, with provisional closures, together with a range of sources of evidence, in order to build up a picture of the various forces at work in the economy. Forming a view on the basis of this plurality of knowledge in turn requires the exercise of judgment according to human logic on the part of economists.
